Mark Bowden - Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War

"Whoever does not have the stomach for this fight, let him depart. Give him money to speed his departure since we wish not to die in that mans company. Whoever lives past today and comes home safely will raise himself every year this day, show his neighbor his scars and tell embellished stories of their great feats of battle. These stories he will teach his son and from this day until the end of the world we shall be remembered. We few, we happy few, we band of brothers; for whoever has shed his blood with me shall be my brother. And those men afraid to go will think themselves lesser men as they hear of how we fought and died together."-William Shakespeare, Henry V
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These were also the words of Task Force Commander Major General William F. Garrison at a makeshift memorial erected at the Mogadishu Airport a few days after the Battle of the Black Sea.

This book, Black Hawk Down, by Mark Bowden, is a running narrative of the Battle of the Black Sea, also known as Ma-alinti Rangers (Day of the Rangers), depending on which side you were cheering on. The battle occurred on a late Sunday afternoon, October 3, 1993. It took the author over three years to collect all of the information in the book from interviews, taped radio communications and actual video footage of the battle. This book is one of the most, if not the most, complete compilations of information on this battle published to date. This is surprising in light of the fact that this battle was one of the most extensively documented in United States military history. There are audio tapes, hard documentation, videotapes, CNN broadcasts and countless eyewitness reports. Remember, this is the military intervention where CNN was waiting on the shore for the first wave of Navy SEALS.

This book also does a great job of conveying the fear, excitement and horror of battle from the grunts point of view. This is not always an easy thing to do, especially as the author was never himself in the military. A journalist for the Philadelphia Enquirer, Mr. Bowden was not in Somalia at the time of the battle, which makes the realism of his writing more impressive.

THE BATTLE

The book shows how an attempt to bring relief to the starving people of Somalia (Operation Restore Hope) degenerated into a manhunt for Mohamed Farrah Aidid. Aidid was a strongarm warlord for the Habr Gidr clan. He was labelled a thug personally by US Secretary of State Madeline Albright. The HG clan was successful in uniting many of the people of Somalia against UN relief efforts. On that Sunday morning, Omar Salad (Aidid's top political adviser, not a green leafy appetizer) was giving his weekly anti-UN speech near the Bakara Market. This market was the heart of the HG world. The Bakara Market was a place to be avoided. No UN forces had been in the area since the US Marines had left in the spring. Being the center of the HG clan influence, this was the place Aidid could put up his strongest resistance.

After the speech Salad was to meet with Abdi "Qeybdid" Hassan Awale, Aidid's Interior Minister, two targets too tempting for the UN Forces to pass by in their attempts to snatch Aidid and his upper echelon staff.

The raid on Aidids ministers, which led to the battle, is covered extensively. From the initial raid on the Olympic Hotel, meeting place of Salad and "Qeybdid", to the disintegration of the operational plan of the Rangers/Delta Force, and the aftermath we are all familiar with, American soldiers being dragged through the streets, the battle is covered in intricate detail. The troops caught their quarries that day, Salad and "Qeybdid", but the entire operation in Somalia blew up in Americas face, and we ultimately lost the war. This book, a factual account of what really happened, is excellent reporting. I feel, however, that the conclusions drawn, or possibly the lack of them, are faulty.

ARMCHAIR GENERAL

Although I enjoyed the book, I strongly disagree with the authors conclusions. The way I read it, there was no blame to be laid over this disaster. He also argues the point that an American armored presence (tanks, etc.) would not have saved lives during the Battle of The Black Sea. These two points go together, and I disagree with both points.

As for blame, that should go from the White House on down to Garrison, the man with the plan. Armor was requested the month before by the Pentagon, and was denied by Les Aspin, then Secretary of Defense. The request was turned down so as not to give the impression of an expanding American presence in a conflict with rather lackluster support from both Congress and the American people. Although Les Aspin resigned a month after the Battle of The Black Sea, Mr. Bowden glosses over these points.

MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM F. GARRISON

The risks were too high. Garrison knew this. In a memo written by him a few months prior to the raid he wrote:

"If we go into the Bakara Market, there's no question we'll win the gunfight, but we might lose the war".

The timing of the raid was also poor, and it is amazing that the author missed this in his conclusions. During the daylight hours the UN forces lost their advantage of night vision equipment. In addition, Aidids younger fighters were addicted to a mild amphetimine called 'khat', which most started chewing around noon. By mid-afternoon, they were wired. The author seems to believe that the destruction of Garrisons career was a mistake, and not that it had to do with bad command decisions. Garrison himself took the blame.

DISPOSITION OF FORCES

The author, as noted previously, states that he does not see how armor would have saved lives. The relief force stationed in Mogadishu for the company of Rangers were two companies of light infantry from the 10th Mountain Division. I've served in both Ranger and light infantry battalions, and they are very similar. The relief force was comprised of the two companies and the remnants of the Ranger company. They were forced to use Pakistani tanks (M-48's; outdated and long dropped from the US inventory) with Malaysian armored personnel carriers (German made Condors; basically glorified dump trucks). The language and communication problems took hours to work out. Two troops of American armor on ready standby could have been rolling as soon as the stuff hit the fan. In my opinion, this would have reduced casualties on both sides. Seventeen dead, dozens wounded for the American, and conservative estimates of over 500 dead and at least the same amount wounded for the Somalis.

The Somalis were not in possession of any weapon systems to stop either our main battle tanks or our armored personnel carriers. If used swiftly enough the armor could have pushed through any hastily prepared defenses. The sheer ferocity of an attack of this kind would have collapsed any kind of organized defense. These were militia men, not an organized army. This would have ended the prolonged firefights and reduced casualties on both sides.

From the lost convoy to the men trapped at the "Alamo", Black Hawk Down goes into amazing detail about the Battle of the Black Sea. For those interested in military history, it's a real page turner. It is also a must read for those of you who always wondered what it's like to be one of the boys. In my opinion, the information is impeccable, but I would take the conclusions with a grain of salt.